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State Secrets Privilege: The Executive
Caprice Runs Rampant
No nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too close an inspection into the conduct of its officers but many have been brought to ruin,
and reduced to slavery, by suffering gradual imposition and abuses,
which were imperceptible, only because the means ofpublicity have not
been secured.
Edward Livingston'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The majority of all rules of evidence share as their common justi2
fication some tendency to facilitate the illumination of the truth.
Conversely, privileges perform an anomalous function in the law of
evidence. 3 Rather than advancing the ascertainment of the truth,
privileges serve to make the fact-finding process more difficult, or
sometimes impossible, by facilitating the cloak of evidence which may
be both material and relevant to the litigation process. 4 While privileges pose "an obstacle to the administration of justice,"' 5 they serve to
promote countervailing concerns such as "the protection of interests
...

which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social im-

portance to justify some sacrifice of availability of evidence." ' 6 Nowhere is this inherent tension better illustrated than in litigation
between a private citizen and the government. A litigant's need for
7
information often conflicts with the government's need for secrecy.
As Professor McCormick noted:
Since the turn of the century the activities of government have
1. 1 E. LIVINGSTON, WORKS 15 (1873).
2. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 170 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984)
(discussing origins of privileges).
3. Id. at 171.
4. Id.
5. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (J. McNaughton
rev. 1961) (discussing duty to give testimony). Dean Wigmore states that as a result of the
inherent danger which evidentiary privileges pose to the litigation process, they should in every
instance be limited to their narrowest purpose. Id.
6. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 72, at 170.

7. This problem has sometimes been referred to as a conflict between the public interest
in secrecy and the private interest of the litigant. See, e.g., Note, Evidence: Privilege Against
Revealing State Secrets, 10 OKLA. L. REV. 336 (1957).
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multiplied in number and widened in scope, and the need of litigants for the disclosure and proof of documents and other information in the possession of government officials has correspondingly
increased. When this need is asserted and opposed, the resultant
question requires a delicate and judicious balancing of the public
interest in the secrecy of "classified" official information against
the public interest in the protection of the claim of the individual to
8
due process of law in the redress of grievances.
In theory, the invocation of an evidentiary privilege by the government requires the courts to engage in a balancing of these competing
interests. In practice, however, this balancing does not always occur.
This Comment asserts that as to the privilege for military, diplomatic, and state secrets (the state secrets privilege), the federal judiciary has abdicated its role of balancing the competing interests of the
litigant and the government to the caprice of the federal executive. In
addition, this Comment argues that as a result of the current standard
of review for claims of the state secrets privilege established in United
States v. Reynolds, 9 the degree of judicial involvement in assessing
claims of this privilege by the executive is left unresolved. As a result,
the courts have tended to treat claims of the state secrets privilege as
absolute. In so doing, the courts have not only provided the executive
with a shield against governmental liability, but also have provided
the executive with a sword to commit constitutional transgressions of
individual rights. Finally, this Comment proposes that, under the rationale of United States v. Nixon, 10 the state secrets privilege should be
accorded a qualified status. Under this qualified status approach, the
ultimate decision of whether or not to allow a specific state secrets
privilege claim should be made by the federal judiciary after balancing
the litigant's need for discovery against the executive's legitimate interest in secrecy.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege
that allows the government to resist discovery of information and to
prevent any person from giving such information if "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be di8.
9.

10.

C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 107, at 262.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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vulged.'
The privilege also protects information relating to foreign
intelligence gathering methods or capabilities, 12 as well as information
which could disrupt diplomatic relations with foreign governments.13
The existence of the state secrets privilege "has never been
doubted." 14
11. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (details of recently developed electronic
equipment); see also Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (in suit
for patent infringement, production of drawings of military apparatus not required when the
government, as intervenor, asserted that to do so would reveal military secrets); Firth Sterling
Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (in suit for patent infringement,
copies of drawings made by defendant of armor piercing projectiles under a contract with the
Navy ordered expunged from the record, where the Navy had intervened and objected); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing,635 F.2d 281
(4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (no action for wrongful interference with prospective contractual
relations between plaintiff and Navy could be maintained where any attempt on the part of the
plaintiff to establish prima facie case threatened overriding interest of United States in secrecy); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876) (no action may be maintained on a contract
with the government for secret service as a spy during the Civil War).
12. See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1038 (1984) (upholding state secrets privilege made by various federal officials and agencies in
a constitutional tort action brought by plaintiffs seeking compensation for warrantless electronic surveillance); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding claim of state
secrets privilege made by National Security Agency with respect to its interceptions of communications involving individuals and organizations formerly active in protesting United States
involvement in the Vietnam War, where these communications either originated in the United
States for transmission abroad or originated abroad for transmission to the United States);
A.C.L.U. v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding state secrets privilege claim by
government against suit seeking redress for alleged illegal investigation and intelligence gathering activities aimed at plaintiff); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding claim
of state secrets privilege made by National Security Agency with respect to its interceptions of
communications involving individuals and organizations formerly active in protesting United
States involvement in the Vietnam War, where these communications either originated in the
United States for transmission abroad or originated abroad for transmission to the United
States); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding claim of state secrets privilege
as to information regarding employment of defendant CIA agent operating in the United
States); Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (motion to compel answers to
interrogatories denied in an action by an attorney against officials of the federal government
for wiretap damages after assertion by government of state secrets privilege).
13. See, e.g., Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D.
Md. 1956) (state secrets privilege banned production of memoranda of conversations between
American and British officials concerning recognition of sovereign immunity of People's Republic of China).
14. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2378, at 794. For a discussion of the origins and
development of the state secrets privilege, see generally 4 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 26.61 (1970); M. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 5.02 (1984); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 107; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
509 [01]-[04] (1986); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2019, at 158-60 (1970); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 226 (1979);
see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-14 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,

& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1983); Comment, The Military & State Secrets
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However, use of the state secrets privilege has been limited.' 5 Its
genesis in American jurisprudence can be traced to Aaron Burr's trial
for treason. 16 In United States v. Burr, the Court was faced with the
issue of whether the judiciary had the power to compel testimony
from the executive in the face of an assertion of executive privilege.
Chief Justice John Marshall issued a subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson to produce correspondence between the President and
General Wilkerson. The government objected that the correspondence probably revealed diplomatic communications between the
United States and Spain. After holding that the President could be
subpoenaed and examined as a witness and be required to produce
any papers in his possession, Chief Justice Marshall recognized a privilege for documents containing state secrets:
There is certainly nothing before the court which shows that the
letter in question contains any matter the disclosure of which
would endanger the public safety. If it does contain such matter,
the fact may appear before disclosure is made. If it does contain
any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not
the wish of the executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be
suppressed. 17
Privilege: Protectionfor the National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J.
570 (1982); Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966); Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in JudicialProceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1958); Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of the Executive
Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1949); Berger & Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1950); Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved
Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962); Gromley, Discovery Against the Government of Military and
Other ConfidentialMatters, 43 Ky. L.J. 343 (1955); Mitchell, Governmental Secrecy in Theory
and Practice, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1958); Rogers, Constitutional Law. The Papers of the
Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A. J. 941 (1958); Taubeneck & Sexton, Executive Privilege and the
Court'sRight to Know, 48 GEO. L.J. 486 (1960); Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege,
22 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1974).
As one court has noted, "A ranking of the various privileges recognized in our courts
would be a delicate undertaking at best, but it is quite clear that the privilege to protect state
secrets must head the list." Halkin, 598 F.2d at 7. This article recognizes that in addition to
the state secrets privilege, there are many other evidentiary privileges for governmental secrets.
However, an examination of these various privileges is beyond the scope of this article. This
article will limit its focus to the state secrets privilege, and to the executive privilege to the
extent that it impacts the state secrets privilege.
15. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
16. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); see also R.
BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 215-24 (1974).
17. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.

1987]

State Secrets Privilege

449

Thus, Chief Justice Marshall deemed that the rationale for the state
secrets privilege was rooted in the interest of protecting the public
safety.
The public policy foundation of the state secrets privilege was
further articulated in Totten v. United States. 8 In Totten, a suit was
brought by the claimant to recover compensation allegedly owing to a
deceased wartime spy for espionage conducted during the Civil War
under a contract with the United States. Justice Field, after exploring
the unique character of a contractual relationship for espionage, held
that no action could be maintained on a contract with the government
for secret service as a spy. Justice Field stated that "[t]he secrecy
which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement." 9 Justice Field then enunciated the rationale for the holding:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids
the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow
20
the confidence to be violated.
Thus, like the court in Burr, the court in Totten was persuaded that
the state secrets privilege is rooted in public policy; the need to protect the national security, as well as the confidential nature of certain
communications.
However, in juxtaposition to these early cases, many of the modem cases have suggested or argued that the state secrets privilege derives from the separation of powers doctrine.2 1 The constitutional
basis of the state secrets privilege is unclear. In United States v. Reynolds,22 the Court suggested that the privilege was rooted in the separation of powers. 23 In United States v. Nixon,2 4 the Court appears to
have derived the privilege from the President's Article II duties as
Commander in Chief and his responsibility for the conduct of foreign
18. 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
19. Id. at 107. Justice Field stated further that
If upon contracts of such a nature an action against the government could be maintained ...,whenever an agent should deem himself entitled to a greater or different
compensation than that awarded to him, the whole service in any case, and the manner of its discharge, with the details of dealings with individuals and officers, might
be exposed, to the serious detriment of the public.

Id. at 106-07.
20. Id. at 107.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
Id. at 6 n.9.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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affairs. 25 One modem commentator, in discussing the basic unsettled
problem as to the degree of judicial involvement in assessing claims of
the privilege, noted "the understandable desire of courts to avoid
murky constitutional issues involving the separation of powers doctrine, and to avoid as well a stark confrontation with the executive
26
branch."

III.

ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN RULE:
UNITED STA TES V REYNOLDS

A.

United States District Court Decision

The widows of three civilians killed in the crash of an Air Force
B-29 bomber during a flight to test certain secret electronic equipment
27
brought wrongful death claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act
against the United States.2 8 During discovery, the plaintiffs moved
for production of an accident report prepared by the Air Force, as
well as statements by the three surviving crew members taken at the
30
time of the accident.2 9 The government filed a motion to quash,
invoking Air Force regulations promulgated pursuant to the federal
31
housekeeping statute.
The district court denied the motion to quash, and ordered production of the documents. 32 Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of the
Air Force filed a formal claim of privilege with the district court, asserting both the right to withhold information under the housekeeping statute, as well as the further right to withhold the information
because it was of such a "confidential" nature that disclosure would
be "prejudicial to this Department and would not be in the public
25. Id. at 710; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1 which states that "[t]he President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
26. 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 227, at 969 (1979).

27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (1982). The Federal Tort Claims Act provides in relevant
part:
(b) [T]he district courts .. .shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.
Id. at § 1346.
28. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
29. Id. at 469.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
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interest. ' 3 As a compromise, the Air Force offered instead to produce the witnesses who had testified at the investigation, allowing
them to refresh their memories from any statement they 34made to the
investigators, and testify as to any matter not classified.
The district court ordered the government to submit the documents in question "for examination by the court... so that the court
could determine whether the disclosure 'would violate the Government's privilege against disclosure of matters involving the national or
public interest.' ",35 When the government refused to comply, the
court ordered that the facts on the question of negligence be taken as
established in plaintiffs' favor, and prohibited the government from
introducing evidence to controvert those facts. 36 After a hearing on
the damages issue, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs. 37
B.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 38 In an
opinion by Judge Maris, the court of appeals first addressed the government's contention that the housekeeping statute:
In giving to the Secretary of the Air Force authority to prescribe
regulations for the custody and use of the records and papers of his
department necessarily confers upon him full discretionary power
in the public interest to refuse to produce any such records for
examination and use in a judicial
proceeding and that such records
' 39
thereby become "privileged.

Even though the court acknowledged the validity of the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Air Force under the housekeeping statute, 40 the court refused to recognize the government's
assertion that the branches of the executive departments are entitled
to an absolute housekeeping privilege against disclosure of their inter33. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 996 (3d Cir. 1951). An accompanying affidavit by the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force further stated that the report could not
be furnished "without seriously hampering national security, flying safety and the development
of highly technical and secret military equipment." Id. at 990.
34. Id. at 990.
35. Id. at 990-91.
36. Id. at 991.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 998.
39. Id. at 992. The court also noted that the government's assertion brought into focus
considerations based upon the separation of powers. Id.
40. Id.
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nal operations. 4' The court reasoned that any privilege under the
housekeeping statute must yield to the expression of the congressional
will in the Federal Tort Claims Act in which the government is
treated as if it were a private person. 4 2 The court noted "the recognition of such a sweeping privilege against any disclosure of the internal
operations of the executive departments of the Government as contrary to a sound public policy."' 4 3 The court observed that:
It is but a small step to assert a privilege against any disclosure of
records merely because they might prove embarrassing to government officers. Indeed it requires no great flight of imagination to
realize that if the Government's contentions . . . were affirmed the
privilege against disclosure might gradually be enlarged by executive determinations until, as is the case in some nations today, it
embraced the whole range of governmental activities. 44
The court next addressed the government's contention that, in
addition to the housekeeping statute, the documents at issue were protected from production by the state secrets privilege. 4 5 The court recognized the existence of the privilege and stated unequivocally that if
the material in question was in fact privileged, the government could
decline disclosure. 46 However, the government, taking umbrage with
the district court's ruling that the documents should be submitted for
an inspection in camera to determine the validity of the privilege
claim, contended that "it is within the sole province of the Secretary
of the Air Force to determine whether any privileged material is contained in the documents and that his determination of this question
must be accepted by the district court without any independent consideration of the matter by it."' 47 The court of appeals vehemently
disagreed with the government's position, holding in camera inspection was the proper mechanism for determining the validity of a state
secrets privilege claim. Specifically, the court of appeals stated:
We cannot accede to this proposition. On the contrary we are sat41. Id. at 994.
42. Id. It should be noted that in Reynolds, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court were in direct disagreement over the effect of the Federal Tort Claims Act on
the assertion of governmental evidentiary privileges. See infra text accompanying note 54.
43. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d at 995.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 996. The court noted that "[t]he claim of privilege thus made is of a wholly
different character from the one previously discussed. It asserts in effect that the documents
sought to be produced contain state secrets of a military character." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 996-97.
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isfied that a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence relevant
to the issues in a pending law suit involves a justiciable question,
traditionally within the competence of the courts, which is to be
determined in accordance with the appropriate rules of evidence,
upon the submission of the documents in question to the judge for
his examination in camera. Such examination must obviously be
ex parte and in camera if the privilege is not to be lost in its assertion. But to hold that the head of an executive department of the
Government in a suit to which the United States is a party may
conclusively determine the Government's claim of privilege is to
abdicate the judicial function and permit the executive branch of
province of the judicithe Government to infringe the independent
48
ary as laid down by the Constitution.
The court reasoned that in camera review of a state secrets privilege claim is not only mandated by the separation of powers doctrine,
but is also a uniquely judicial function which the judiciary is competent to perform. The court noted:
The Government of the United States is one of checks and balances. One of the principal checks is furnished by the independent
judiciary which the Constitution established. Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the Government may constitutionally encroach upon the field which the Constitution has
reserved for the judiciary by transferring to itself the power to decide justiciable questions which arise in cases or controversies submitted to the judicial branch for decision. Nor is there any danger
to the public interest in submitting the question of privilege to the
decision of the courts. The judges of the United States are public
officers whose responsibility under the Constitution is just as great
as that of the heads of the executive departments. When Government documents are submitted to them in camera under a claim of
privilege the judges may be depended upon to protect with the
greatest of care the public interest in preventing the disclosure of
matters which may fairly be characterized as privileged. And if, as
the Government asserts is sometimes the case, a knowledge of
background facts is necessary to enable one properly to pass on the
claim of privilege those facts also may be presented to the judge in
49

camera.
48.
49.

Id. at 997.
Id. at 997-98.
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C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. 50 In an
51
opinion by Chief Justice Vinson on behalf of a six-member majority,
the Court first addressed the contention of the government that "the
executive department heads have power to withhold any documents
in their custody from judicial view if they deem it to be in the public
interest" and the opposing assertion by respondents that "the executive's power to withhold documents was waived by the Tort Claims
Act."'5 2 The majority noted that "[b]oth positions have constitutional
overtones which we find it unnecessary to pass upon, there being a
narrower ground for decision. ' ' 53 The Court then rejected the theory
that the Federal Tort Claims Act waived any privilege of nondisclosure. The majority cited the provision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allowing only discovery of matters "not privileged," and
analyzed the government's claim as a matter of privilege under the
law of evidence.5 4 The Court then stated that when the Secretary of
the Air Force lodged his formal claim of privilege, "he attempted
' 55
therein to invoke the privilege against revealing military secrets.
After observing that judicial experience with the state secrets privilege
"has been limited in this country, ' 56 the Court set out certain procedural requirements which must initially be satisfied in order to properly assert the state secrets privilege. The Court stated that:
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by
it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not
to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The
court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a
57
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
The majority noted that "[tihe latter requirement is the only one
50. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
51. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented "substantially for the reasons set
forth in the opinion of Judge Maris below." See id. at 12.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id. at 7-8. The reviewing officer may assert the privilege by personal testimony, by
affidavits describing why the material should not be made public, or by submitting the material
itself for in camera review. See Comment, supra note 14, at 572.
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which presents real difficulty," analogizing it to the judicial treatment
of the privilege against self-incrimination in trying to reach a
"formula of compromise." 58 In so doing, the majority tried to strike a
similar balance between the litigants' need for discovery and the executive's legitimate interest in maintaining secrecy for the national security in the context of a claim of the state secrets privilege. In this
context, Chief Justice Vinson further held that the court must independently decide the validity of a privilege claim and that "[j]udicial
control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice
of executive officers." '5 9 However, the Chief Justice noted that judicial
inquiry into the underlying substance of the claim should not be carried to the point where validation of the claim would result in the
disclosure of the very information the privilege was designed to protect. 60 While attempting to formulate a workable compromise between the competing interests of the government and the litigants, the
court created an exception whereby a claim of the state secrets privilege would be supported without in camera review of the evidence:
Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically
require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the
court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security
which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon examina58. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9. With regard to the privilege against selfincrimination, the Court observed:
The privilege against self-incrimination presented the courts with a similar sort of
problem. Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a complete abandonment
of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses .... Neither extreme prevailed,
and a sound formula of compromise was developed.

Id. at 8-9.
The Court then articulated the balancing process employed by the courts when the privilege against self-incrimination was invoked:
[T]he court must be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances, and "from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure would result." (citations omitted). If the
court is so satisfied, the claim of the privilege will be accepted without requiring
further disclosure.
Id. at 9.
59. Id. at 9-10.
60. Id. at 8.

456
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tion of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. 61
Thus, in such a situation, the court's role is limited to the question of whether the privilege was claimed under circumstances indicating a "reasonable possibility" that military or state secrets would
be revealed. When this is the situation, the majority in Reynolds held
that the litigant's interest in discovery is a factor, but only to the degree of scrutiny that the court should accord a privilege claim. 62 The
standard of review was stated by Chief Justice Vinson as follows:
In each case, the showing of necessity which is made [by the plaintiff] will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying
itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.
Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege
should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. 63
In applying the foregoing principles to the facts of the case, the
majority concluded that the formal claim of privilege by the Secretary
of the Air Force was sufficient to cut off further demands for the disclosure of the documents, as the plaintiffs had made only a "dubious
showing of necessity. ' 64 Moreover, the Court found that the offer of
the Air Force to produce the essential witnesses for deposition
presented plaintiffs with a "reasonable opportunity" to develop the
essential facts and concluded "[w]e think that offer should have been
accepted."'65 Finally, the majority addressed the respondent's contention that in a civil forum where the government is a defendant, as is
the case in criminal litigation where the government prosecutes, the
government can only invoke the state secrets privilege at the price of
losing the lawsuit. 66 However, the majority stated that "[s]uch rationale has no application in a civil forum where the Government is not
the moving party, but is a defendant only on terms to which it has
consented. ' 67 Thus, the Court held that where the state secrets privilege is successfully asserted, military and state secrets are not subject
to discovery in a civil suit against the government.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

10.
11.
10-11.
11.
12.
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THE EFFECTS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE ON THE
LITIGATION PROCESS

The effect of the invocation of the state secrets privilege varies
depending on the context in which it is asserted.
A.

Criminal Litigation Where the Government Prosecutes

When the government institutes criminal proceedings in which
information otherwise within the ambit of the state secrets privilege is
shown to be relevant and necessary to the defense of a charge, the
government has been held to have waived the privilege. 68 In such a
case, if the government nevertheless insists upon withholding the information shown to be relevant and necessary, the court must take
appropriate remedial action, including, if necessary, dismissal of the
charge. 69 In Reynolds, the majority, in dicta, articulated the rationale
behind this rule:
The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government
which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is
done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and
then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of
70
anything which might be material to his defense.
Therefore, in the context of criminal litigation, there is a built-in
system to guarantee that the defendant's interests are considered. The
reason for this rule is the protection of liberty from criminal incarceration without due process of law provided by the Fifth Amendment. 7 1
68. See, e.g., United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946);
United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53 (1957).
69. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
70. Id.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment provides in relevant part: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
Id. It should be
further noted that in a criminal case, where the government has in its possession a statement
made by a government witness prior to trial respecting the subject matter of his testimony, on
proper application the statement must be disclosed to the defendant for use in cross-examination of that witness, even if the statement involves a state secret. See Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657 (1957). Under this rule, if the government refuses to furnish the material ordered
by the court, the court may strike the witness' testimony from the record, declare a mistrial, or
take such other remedial action as the interests of justice require, including dismissal of the
case. Id.
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Civil Litigation Where the Government Prosecutes

When the government institutes civil litigation while withholding
evidence adverse to its interests or pertinent to the claim or defense of
an adverse litigant, there is authority for the view that the government
has waived its privilege as to that evidence. 72 The rationale of this
rule is that the government, by filing suit, put the privileged information at issue and made it relevant to the case. It would, therefore, be
unfair to allow the government to subsequently rely on the privilege
to the detriment of the defendant.
C.

Civil Litigation Where the Government is Not a Party

When the government invokes the state secrets privilege in the
context of civil litigation to which it is not a party, the effect is simply
to make the evidence unavailable to the participants. It is as though a
witness had died or claimed the privilege aginst self-incrimination,
and no specification of the consequences is necessary. 73 The rule deals
only with the effect of a successful claim of privilege by the government in proceedings to which it is not a party. The rationale of this
rule is that the resolution of an evidentiary dispute should not "relate
to who has won the race to the courthouse. ' 74 In such a case, sanctions against either party are inappropriate because neither party is
75
responsible for the suppression of the evidence.
However, there is authority to the effect that if any attempt on
the part of a plaintiff to establish aprimafaciecase would result in the
possible disclosure of state secrets, "the overriding interest of the
United States and the preservation of its state secrets precludes any
further attempt to pursue the litigation." ' 76 Thus, even where there is
72. See Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975). But see Republic of
China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956) (holding that the
United States was not barred from maintaining a libel action against ship insurers although it
had invoked the state secrets privilege with respect to the answer to one interrogatory and the
insurers contended that the answer might help them to establish an affirmative defense).
73. See Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(e), 56
F.R.D. 183, 254 (1973); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 109, at 268; 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 509[10] at 509-65 (1979); 11J. MOORE & H. BENDIX,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

app. 1-78 (2d ed. 1976).

74. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 270-71.
76. Id. at 281; see also Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 41 n.4 (2d Cir. 1958).
However, the application of this rule can pose grave consequences:
Any litigant . . . whose proof is hampered by the invocation of [the state secrets
privilege] can hereafter be turned away from his efforts to obtain justice on the questionable grounds that, for reasons as to which he must remain uninformed, he might
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only the potential for the revelation of state secrets, dismissal of the
action is appropriate.
D.

Civil Litigation Where the Government Defends

When the government is a defendant in civil litigation and asserts
the state secrets privilege, the Reynolds standard is triggered. 77 Once
the plaintiff has met his initial burden of showing that the information
he seeks is both relevant and material to prove his case, the burden
shifts to the government to show that the evidence sought involves
military, diplomatic, or state secrets that, in the interests of national
security, should not be divulged. 78 The disclosure must reasonably be
expected to cause exceptionally grave danger or serious damage to
national security. It is not, however, necessary that the government
show that harm will inevitably result, but only that there is a reasonable danger that harm will result from disclosure. 79 Furthermore, the
showing made by the government need not extend to disclosing infor80
mation protected by the privilege, even to the judge alone in camera.
The showing made by the government must only reasonably indicate
that compulsion of the evidence would expose military, diplomatic, or
state secrets. 8'
In theory, the court has the ultimate authority to determine from
all of the facts, circumstances, and documents presented by the parties whether the state secrets privilege should be upheld. Some courts
have interpreted the Reynolds approach to allow a balancing of the
competing interests, with a variable burden of proof placed upon the
government depending on the need for the privileged material shown
by the party seeking disclosure. 82 However, the prevailing approach
by the majority of jurisdictions is that while a court, when evaluating
a claim of the privilege, may take into account the need for the information demonstrated by the party seeking disclosure, that need is
only a factor in determining the extent of the court's inquiry into the
stumble intrusively into a protected area. The opportunities for unexplicated imposition of arbitrary fiat under the rule the majority adopts are potentially frightening.
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 282 (4th Cir. 1980) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
77. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
78. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); A.C.L.U. v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th
Cir. 1980).
79. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
80. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., A.C.L.U. v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980).
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appropriateness of the claim.8 3
If the court decides that compulsion of the evidence will not
jeopardize national security, in camera review of the material at issue
may be ordered. The court may not permit the requester's counsel to
participate in such examination. 8 4 However, if the court decides
"from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose" state secrets, in camera review is inappropriate.8 5
When properly invoked, the state secrets privilege is absolute.
No competing public or private interest can be advanced to compel
disclosure of information found to be protected by a claim of this
privilege.8 6 Assertion of the privilege does not compel a court to issue
any sanction against the government even if the pertinent information
83. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; see also Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d at 990.
If a compelling showing of need has been made and at the same time the surrounding
circumstances do not make apparent the likelihood that disclosure will lead to serious injury,
the court can insist that the claim of privilege be made on the public record and that the
government either publicly explain the kinds of injury to the national security it seeks to avoid,
or indicate why such an explanation itself would endanger the national security. See Ellsberg
v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
In contrast to the Reynolds approach, the individual seeking disclosure of sensitive documents under the Freedom of Information Act is not required to make a showing of need or
interest for the records. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). Any showing of need or interest is irrelevant. See Forshen v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1134 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. F.T.C., 450 F.2d 698, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Thus, as Judge
Bazelon observed in his dissent in Halkin v. Helms, the Reynolds standard of review:
produces the anamolous result that a FOIA requestor, who may have no special need
for the requested information, is given broader access to government information
than a plaintiff who requires the information in order to pursue remedies for violation of constitutional rights ....
Not only does this result defy common sense, but
ultimately it will simply lead to a waste of judicial resources. Henceforth, plaintiffs
seeking information in a civil suit will simply file a simultaneous FOIA request to
reap the advantage of the broader inquiry under FOIA. Nothing will be gained except duplication and delay.
Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
For a general discussion of the process for seeking disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, see Comment, NationalSecurity and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85
YALE L.J. 401 (1976).
84. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 7; Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 486 (E.D. Mich.
1977). As the court noted in Ellsberg v. Mitchell:
The rationale for this rule is that our nation's security is too important to be entrusted to the good faith and circumspection of a litigant's lawyer (whose sense of
obligation to his client is likely to strain his fidelity to his pledge of secrecy) or to the
coercive power of a protective order.
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 61.
85. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
86. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 7; Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d at 990; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at Ii.
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is necessary to prove some element of a plaintiff's case.8 7 Thus, the
consequence of successfully asserting the state secrets privilege is
grave, since once it is established, it serves as an absolute bar to disclosure. This effectively forecloses relief for violations of individuals'
rights by precluding the discovery of evidence that the transgressions
88
did occur.
V.

CRITICISMS OF THE REYNOLDS STANDARD

The standard articulated in United States v. Reynolds for evaluating claims by the government of the state secrets privilege is inadequate for seven major reasons: 1) the procedural requirement that the
department head may invoke the privilege only after personal consideration of the material rarely occurs in practice; 2) the Reynolds standard is largely based on the unjustified assumption that the federal
judiciary is neither competent, nor trustworthy enough to decide sensitive issues of national security; 3) the executive branch tends to be
biased in favor of the need for secrecy; 4) the executive branch may
assert the privilege unevenly; 5) the Reynolds standard does not
clearly articulate what information relates to "national security"; 6)
the Reynolds standard does not provide a trial court with a clear
roadmap for evaluating when in camera review is unnecessary; 7) the
Reynolds standard violates the separation of powers doctrine. These
criticisms will be discussed below.
A.

PersonalConsiderationBy Head of Department

The first criticism of the Reynolds standard is that the procedure
requiring the department head to invoke the privilege only after personal consideration of the material rarely occurs in practice. Professor Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, commented on the process
by which the department head arrives at his decision whether to invoke the privilege:
The subordinate at [the] lowest point, obsessed by the general
dogma against disclosure, prepares a reply denying the application;
he will usually not have the initiative or the courage to propose an
exceptional use of discretion in favor of granting the application.
This draft reply is sent up, "through channels . . ." past two or
87. Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
88. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that dismissal of
plaintiff's claims against the government for illegal surveillance and interception of its foreign
communications was proper because the maintenance of the action depended upon the production of the privileged information); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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more intervening superiors (each one treating it in routine fashion),
till it reaches the Departmental head or other chief officer whose
signature is necessary. Arriving in a ponderous pile of daily draft
correspondence, it receives that necessary signature without fur89
ther consideration.
Moreover, even if the department head does move more pressing
matters aside in order to consider the merits of disclosure requests
before him, he will usually take the staff proposals "on compulsory
faith"; "staff recommendations will inevitably be taken as prima facie
correct." 90 Thus, "[c]ertification by the department head that he has
'personally' considered the matter must in most cases, therefore, be an
empty formality if only because of the relentless pressure of far more
important affairs." 9 1
Yet, in Kinoy v. Mitchell, a federal district court held that it
would not recognize the government's claim that documents sought
were protected by the state secrets privilege until assertion of that
claim was made by a responsible executive officer upon personal consideration. 9 2 In so holding, the court emphasized that the "actual
personal consideration" requirement of Reynolds "is not . . .a mere
technical requirement. Because the Court must rely so heavily upon
the judgment of the responsible executive officer in a case such as this,
it must be clear that the judgment was properly exercised.

'9 3

However, as a result of the administrative process for decision
making within the executive branch, this procedural safeguard is really illusory. The end result is that, in many cases, the decision to
oppose disclosure on privilege grounds will be automatic, with little or
no attention given to the relative possibility of injury attendant to disclosure or the reasons necessitating the discovery.
B.

Judicial Competency and Trustworthiness

The second criticism of the Reynolds standard is that it is based
to a large extent on the unjustified assumption that the federal judiciary is neither competent nor trustworthy enough to decide sensitive
issues of national security. This assumption is unjustified for the following reasons.
89. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2378, at 798 n.7 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2378(a) (3d ed. 1940)).
90. See R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 218 (1974) (quoting Warner Gardner).
91. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 218 (1974).
92. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

93. Id. at 9.
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1. Judicial competence
Proponents of the view that the executive's claim of the state
secrets privilege should be conclusive base this position on the assumption that only an experienced intelligence officer can properly
determine whether certain material should be kept secret. 94 However,
as one court has noted, "such an extreme solution . . . would have
grave drawbacks." 95

In fact, federal judges routinely evaluate technical data in patent,
anti-trust and securities cases, as well as other similarly complex areas
of litigation. 96 Thus, "[s]eemingly there are few cases in which data
are so secret with its value so subtle that a judge could not be trusted

to make a reasoned decision." '97 Moreover, while the executive has a
94. See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 57 n.31 ("[T]he probability that a particular disclosure will have an adverse effect on national security is difficult to assess, particularly
for a judge with little expertise in this area."); see also Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 8-9, where
the court articulated the factors which limit judicial competence to evaluate an executive prediction of the harms likely to result from disclosure of particular materials. The court noted:
It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic
than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and
pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be analyzed and fitted into place to
reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate.
Id.
As the Fourth Circuit has further observed:
The significance of one item of information may frequently depend upon knowledge
of many other items of information. What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may
appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the
questioned item of information in its proper context. The courts, of course, are illequipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in that area.
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
95. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 58.
96. See Zagel, supra note 14, at 900.
97. Id.; see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (Government asserted that domestic electronic surveillance operations were exempt from judicial review, both because the program was an exercise of the President's constitutional power to
protect national security under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), and because issues of domestic surveillance are too complex for judicial evaluation). In United States District Court, the Court
noted:
We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security matters are too
subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases.
Id. at 320.
In Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 955 (1976),
the court applied the United States District Court rationale for domestic security, to cases
involving issues of foreign security: "Although the judicial competence factor arguably has
more force when made in the foreign rather than the domestic security context, the response of
Keith to the analogous argument is nevertheless pertinent to any claim that foreign security
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tendency to overvalue the effect that disclosure of certain material
may have on national security, the courts, however, are unlikely to
undervalue a particular claim of privilege. The difficulty in assessing
the validity of a claim of privilege founded upon state secrets "calls
for a particularly judicial expertise-balancing the government's need
for secrecy against the rights of individuals. ' 98 Furthermore, as one
legal scholar has noted:
The head of an executive department can appraise the public interest of secrecy as well (or perhaps in some cases better) than the
judge, but his official habit and leaning tend to sway him toward a
minimizing of the interest of the individual.... The determination
of questions of fact and the applications of legal standards thereto
in passing upon the admissibility of evidence and the validity of
claims of evidential privilege are traditionally the responsibility of
the judge. As a public functionary he has respect for the executive's scruples against disclosure and at the same time his duties
require him constantly to appraise private interests and to reconcile them with conflicting public policies; he may thus seem better
qualified than the executive to weigh both interests understandingly and to strike a wise balance. 99
Thus, it is clear that the assumption that the judiciary is incompetent to weigh claims of the state secrets privilege is unjustified. The
judiciary, in most cases, is as qualified, if not more qualified, to balance the competing interests. Furthermore, in those rare situations
where a court determines that it is ill-equipped to strike a reasonable
balance, it can employ the expertise of the executive officer invoking
the privilege, in order to provide it with a greater appreciation of the
subtlety or complexity of a particular case.
2.

Judicial trustworthiness

Proponents of the Reynolds standard also contend that even if
the courts are allowed to review the evidence, even an ex parte or in
camera examination is not entirely safe. 100 However, this argument is
involves decisions and information beyond the scope of judicial expertise and experience." Id.
at 641.
98. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 15 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
99. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 110, at 269.
100. See Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1979), where the court stated:
It is not to slight judges, lawyers or anyone else to suggest that any such disclosure
carries with it serious risk that highly sensitive information may be compromised. In
our own chambers, we are ill equipped to provide the kind of security highly sensitive
information should have.
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also unjustified. Federal judges are just as much employees of the
federal government as are executive officers. Judges who review sensitive material in camera would not pose any greater threat to national
security than would an employee of the executive branch. As Professor Wigmore has observed: "Is it to be said that even ...disclosure

[during in camera review] cannot be trusted? Shall every subordinate
in the department have access to the secret, and not the presiding
officer of justice? Cannot the constitutionally coordinate body of government share the confidence?"''0
Indeed, executive subordinates often have access to highly sensitive material.102 Thus, "it is singular that there should be any qualms
about permitting the courts to weigh any administrative claims for
03
secrecy."1
C. The Executive Branch Tends to be Biased in Favor
of the Needs of Secrecy
The third criticism of the Reynolds standard is that it gives the
executive too much leeway to invoke the state secrets privilege, without the concomitant review by the court, where "from all the circumstances .

. .,

there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the

evidence will expose military matters."' 1 4 The weakness of this attempt to try to strike a balance between the interests of the litigant
and the government is that the executive, which must only carry a
minimal burden of proof, has an institutional tendency to be biased in
favor of the need for secrecy. The end result is that whenever the
executive is "given a blank cheque," it yields "to the temptation to
overdraw."1 05
This temptation to overdraw is manifested in many ways. First,
"[tihe executive has made the state secrets problem worse than it need
10 6
be by retaining unnecessary classifications on billions of items."'
Second, when "all the circumstances" dictate that a state secret is
involved which should not be divulged in the interests of national seId. (quoting Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975)).
101. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (3d ed. 1940).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, Etc., 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal.

1954) (matters of rarest secrecy must often be duplicated by subordinates).
103. R. BERGER,EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 220 (1974).
104.
105.
106.

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285 (2d ed. 1967).
Zagel, supra note 14, at 899.
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curity, and because the executive will almost always be able to argue
that state secrets are involved, the court will almost always defer to
07
the executive's sworn assertion of the privilege.1
Thus, the Reynolds standard provides the executive with the incentive to overclassify information in order to resist discovery. One
author observed that, "in many of the cases [in which the state secrets
privilege is asserted] the information is really being withheld in order
to gain advantage in the suit or to avoid official embarrassment or
simply to avoid troublesome interruption of bureaucratic routine."' 0 8
Thus, "[e]ntrust the administrators with the exclusive power to determine which facts shall be divulged, . . . and the gate to unlimited
extension of the privilege categories is open."' 0 9
Because the Reynolds standard encourages the executive to be
biased in favor of the needs of secrecy, the standard invites unbridled
extension of the privilege categories, and the possibility of untold
abuses.
D.

The Executive Branch may Assert the Privilege Unevenly

The fourth criticism of the Reynolds standard is that it allows the
government to assert the state secrets privilege unevenly. 10 Consequently, the standard allows the government to use the privilege unilaterally to its advantage, and yet not be bound by any standards of
disclosure. The end result is that the standard encourages the executive to engage in political jockeying by manipulating the privilege to
107. Id.
While it would seem to be fair to assume that a court order would at least induce the
executive to reexamine the withholding of information in light of the limited courtroom disclosure contemplated, this has not been the case, in part because the judicial
record has been one of great deference to the executive.

Id.
108. Hardin, supra note 14, at 884. Similarly, Berger & Krash have indicated that "[n]o
one has more eagerly resorted to the discovery machinery than the Government; no one has
been more grudging in making it reciprocally available." Berger & Krash, supra note 14, at
1451.
109. Id. at 1464.
110. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 9. Compare the language of Halkin, where the court
stated that "[t]he government is not estopped from concluding in one case that disclosure is
permissible while in another case it is not," id. at 9, with the reasoning in Ellsberg v. Mitchell,
709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where the court noted:
While ... the revelation in one context of a body of information does not prevent the
government in another arena from invoking the state secrets privilege to shield a
closely related body of information [citations omitted], such selective dissemination
certainly detracts from the government's ability to rely on inferences drawn from the
.surrounding circumstances" in justifying its privilege claim.
Id. at 61 n.47.
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its own political advantage, while allowing the executive to safeguard
a broad class of information when disclosure would be harmful to its
interests in the context of civil litigation.
The executive itself often releases classified information in a variety of settings and for a variety of purposes, even though such disclosure could arguably be detrimental to the national security.II' The
executive allows such disclosures to occur because in most cases, it is
politically advantageous for it to do so. Yet, under the Reynolds standard, the executive is not estopped from releasing sensitive information in one context, while shielding the same information under the
rubric of the state secrets privilege in another context.
As a result, the standard allows the government to release sensitive information to the public when it is beneficial to the government's
cause, while denying disclosure when such release would be detrimental. In cases where the classified information is significantly relevant
to the litigant's claim, invocation of the state secrets privilege may
seriously impede the litigant's ability to carry the requisite burden of
proof. In cases where the classified information is critical to the litigant's cause of action, invocation of the privilege effectively forecloses
the litigant's case. Thus, "[a]pplied in this way, the privilege permits
the executive not only to safeguard a broad class of national security
information, but also to minimize liability incurred for invasions of
personal rights." 12
E.

The Amorphous Concept of National Security

The fifth criticism of the Reynolds standard is that it provides no
guidelines for determining what information should fall within the
state secrets privilege. Most importantly, the courts have not developed a precise definition of "national security." "National security"
is considered to be a generic term that covers a wide range of interests."13 This imprecise definition allows the executive to protect new
kinds of information as the nature of the foreign threat changes.
111.Some examples of executive releases of sensitive information are: (1)President John F.
Kennedy's release of intelligence photographs showing the installation of short range ballistic
missiles in Cuba; (2) President Jimmy Carter's release of information concerning the capabilities of the stealth bomber; (3) President Ronald Reagan's use of intelligence photographs to
indicate the presence of a Soviet and Cuban built airstrip on the Island of Grenada; (4) President Ronald Reagan's release of classified recordings and transcripts of the Soviet pilots' radio
communications with their ground base before shooting down Korean Airlines Flight 007.
112. See Comment, supra note 14, at 578.
113. See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 57 ("Possibly because the state secrets
doctrine pertains generally to nationalsecurity concerns, the privilege has been viewed as both
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The problem with this amorphous definition of "national security" is that "there is not much information in the files of the State and
Defense Departments ...which could not with some plausibility be

given a security classification, if the executive wished to withhold it on
that ground [or on any ground]." '114 When this fact is coupled with
the executive's already zealous propensity to be biased in favor of the
needs of secrecy, it becomes apparent that the Reynolds standard invites serious abuses of the state secrets privilege.

Furthermore, the courts ordinarily do not mandate any threshhold showing of quantity or quality of danger for information to qualify as privileged. There must only be a "reasonable danger" to
national security.'1 5 When such a "reasonable danger" exists, the
courts give the utmost deference to the executive's claim that information "can be useful information to a sophisticated intelligence analyst,
even if the utility or expected danger has not been shown to the
expansive and malleable."); see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. at 483 n.25. The court stated
that
[a]lthough the term "military or state secrets" is amorphous in nature, it should be
defined in the light of reason and experience, much in the same way that the term
"national defense" has been defined in 18 U.S.C. § 793: i.e.,
a "generic concept of
broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness."
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 739 (1971) ("national defense" is a generic
term not susceptible to precise definition); Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941); Note,
NationalSecurity and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 YALE L.J. 401, 409-15
(1978) ("national security" is a concept concerned with intangibles and uncertainties not reducible to concrete definitions); Zagel, supra note 14, at 880-85 (evaluating national defense
related secrets requires an ad hoc analysis and lacks standardized criteria).
114. J. Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question,
66 YALE L.J. 477, 487 (1957).
As one authority has stated in discussing the concept of national security in the context of
the state secrets privilege:
Genuine considerations of national security may require secrecy in regard to the
character and deployment of certain weapons. In my thirty-five years in foreign affairs, however, I almost never found that the public disclosure of political measures
of plans could be truthfully said to jeopardize national security or be more than
temporarily inconvenient.
Once national security has come to be accepted as a cloak for the conduct of
foreign affairs, it is all too likely that public officials will find it irresistably convenient
for cloaking also some of their more far-out domestic activities. In fact, once they
slip into the national security psychosis, they easily begin to equate, as we have so
often seen, the nation's security with their own political power or partisan aims.

Comments of Charles W. Yost, quoted in R.

BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

369 (1974).

115. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10; see also Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 9
(quoting "reasonable danger" standard in Reynolds); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d at 990 ("reasonably could be seen as a threat to the military or diplomatic interests of the nation"); Jabara
v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. at 484 ("reasonable possibility that military or state secrets would be

revealed").
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Thus, the courts do not realistically consider what information would reasonably present the possibility of danger to the national security.' 1 7 The end result is that the Reynolds standard, as it is
currently formulated, protects secrecy for secrecy's sake rather than
essential secrecy."I 8 As a result, the Reynolds standard implicitly endorses the proposition that only the executive can determine what is
to be disclosed and what is to be retained under a veil of privilege.
Thus, as one eminent jurist so keenly warned, "[s]ecurity is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name." 119
court."

F. In Camera Review is Not Mandated in All Situations
The sixth criticism of the Reynolds standard is that it does not
mandate in camera review of the material at issue where, "from all
the circumstances of the case, . . .there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters120 which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged."'
The weakness of this standard is that, "[w]hile having the virtue
of forcing attention upon the purpose underlying the privilege, this
description is frustrating in its imprecision."' 2 1 The executive can almost always forward a plausible argument that there is a "reasonable
danger" that a particular disclosure will adversely affect national security.122 Moreover, in circumstances where such a "reasonable danger" exists, courts have interpreted the Reynolds standard as requiring
"utmost deference" to the executive's assertion that a particular disclosure falls within the privileged category. 123 Consequently, as the
Reynolds standard currently exists, the "from all the circumstances"
test often results in courts upholding the executive's claim of the state
secrets privilege without the safeguard of in camera review, a result
with dangerous ramifications. One scholar has stated that:
116. See A.C.L.U. v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., dissenting);
Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 8-9; Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 58.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1974) ("The passage of
time has a profound effect upon such matters, and that which is of utmost sensitivity one day
may fade into nothing more than interesting history within weeks or months.")
118. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 14, § 226, at 965.
119. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
120. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
121. 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 14, § 226, at 965.
122. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
123. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 9; see, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 58 ("considerable deference"); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d at 996 ("utmost deference"); Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. at 492.
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A court which abdicates its inherent function of determining the
facts upon which the admissibility of evidence depends will furnish
to bureaucratic officials too ample opportunities for abusing the
privilege. The lawful limits of the privilege are extensible beyond
any control if its applicability is left to the determination of the
very official whose interest it may be to shield a wrongdoing under
the privilege. Both principle and policy demand
that the determi124
nation of the privilege shall be for the court.
However, under the current formulation for evaluating claims of
the state secrets privilege, the Reynolds admonition that judicial control over the privilege cannot be abdicated to the caprice of the executive officers is mere surplusage.
G.

The Reynolds Standard Violates the Separation of Powers

The final criticism of the Reynolds standard is that it violates the
separation of powers. In Reynolds, the Court suggested that the state
secrets privilege was rooted in the separation of powers. 125 However,
in United States v. Nixon, 12 6 the Court explicitly derived the state
124. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2379; see also A.C.L.U. v. Brown, 619 F.2d at
1173. ("Any other rule would permit the Government to classify documents just to avoid their
production even though there is need for their production and no true need for secrecy.").
Proponents of the view that the executive's assertion of the state secrets privilege should be
taken as conclusive without further in camera review base this contention in part on the belief
that in camera review could result in a security breach. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. But as one author has observed:
The only argument against this procedure [in camera review] seems to be that there
are some things which even a judge cannot be permitted to see. It is strongly urged
that such material is relatively rare; no reported case has involved such material.
Since the most intimate and shadowed operations of the nation are revealed in detail
to Congressmen and their staffs in executive session, it should be no more dangerous,
and probably less so, to make the same disclosure to a judge sitting in chambers.
Zagel, supra note 14, at 886.
The author further notes that
[i]f the government has any doubt as to the trustworthiness of a judge, a change of
docket could be requested. The lack of direct political pressure on a judge should
also be compared to that on a Congressman.
A Congressman is more likely than a judge to have political motives for revealing or suggesting what he has learned in executive session. Congressional hearings may turn into fishing expeditions as Congressmen do not have to show good
cause for discovery as does a private litigant.
Id. at 886 n.42; see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. at 488 n.40, where the court stated:
It is significant also to note that the district judge in the Kinoy case recognized that
in a case such as this the courts are competent and indeed required to make a judgment as to whether the material in question is a military or state secret and that
"Reynolds does not require the court ... to rely solely on the affidavit of the Attorney General," but may also consider the underlying in camera documents.
125. See supra text accompanying note 23.
126. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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secrets privilege from the separation of powers. 127 In Nixon, the
Court specifically excluded "a claim of need to protect military, diplo28
matic, or sensitive national security secrets" from review in camera.1
Later in the opinion, the Court suggested that the Article II powers of
the President would allow him to invoke an absolute privilege against
the production of materials for use in criminal litigation on no more
than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of
military and diplomatic secrets. 29 Still later, the Court noted that in
the area of military and diplomatic secrets, "the courts have tradition1 30
ally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.'
However, the Court's discussion of the state secrets privilege in
Nixon is pure dicta. The issue presented in Nixon was the proper
standard of review to be accorded claims of executive privilege in the
context of criminal litigation, not the state secrets privilege. Moreover, the Nixon court discussed the constitutional basis of the state
secrets privilege, quoting Justice Jackson's dicta with approval, in
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.:
The President both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It
would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information,
should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken
on information properly held secret. 131
Yet, Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, later recanted
132
from this position in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.
Furthermore, in Pan-American World Airways v. CAB, the court
stated that "though Waterman has not been overruled by the
Supreme Court, its apparently sweeping contours have been eroded
by recent Circuit Court opinions."'' 33 Thus, the discussion in Nixon
that the constitutional basis of the state secrets privilege derives from
the President's Article II powers, itself pure dicta, is based upon language in precedent which is also dicta, and which has been seriously
questioned by many courts.
However, many lower courts have interpreted the language in
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra text accompanying note 25.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 710.
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
392 F.2d 483, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Nixon and Waterman as precedent for the proposition that the separation of powers mandates that the court defer to executive assertions
134
of the state secrets privilege without any independent review.
Thus, in the majority of cases, invocation of the privilege is left to the
"caprice of the executive."
Yet, the separation of powers does not mandate that the courts
defer automatically to executive assertions of the state secrets privilege. To the contrary:
When the Government is a party to litigation involving state
secrets the separation of powers argument works against the executive, for it is normally a judicial function to determine the existence
of a privilege. Giving the executive the final word in determining
the existence of a privilege would infringe this traditionally judicial
35
function.
Thus, it is essential that the Reynolds standard be reformulated,
in order that a more workable equilibrium between the executive and
the judiciary is established.
VI.

TOWARDS

A QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE

The evaluation of the state secrets privilege presents the courts
with two competing considerations. On the one hand, courts are reluctant to delve into executive determinations concerning the state
secrets privilege out of judicial deference to the President's constitutional responsibility for military and international affairs. This deference is also based on judicial recognition that the executive is better
equipped to make such policy determinations, as well as the plethora
of authority that judicial deference is constitutionally mandated.
Yet, on the other hand, there is a need for judicial supervision of
the state secrets privilege to ensure that the privilege is neither used as
a shield to immunize the executive from liability, nor as a sword
which the executive can use to pierce the wall of protection which the
Constitution places between the individual and the government. This
134. See, e.g., Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where the court noted:
The cases and common sense hold that the courts cannot compel the Secretary to
disclose information garnered by him in confidence in this area. If he need not disclose the information he has, the only other course is for the courts to accept his
assertion that disclosure would be detrimental in fields of highest importance entrusted to his exclusive care.
Id. at 77.
135. Zagel, supra note 14, at 893; see also note 48 and accompanying text which discusses
Reynolds v. United States.

State Secrets Privilege

19871

judicial supervision serves to facilitate the private litigant's ability to
obtain evidence in the government's possession, and thus to deter future transgressions on civil liberties through private lawsuits when
government misconduct is alleged. Thus, the scope of the court's
function in determining the validity of a claim of the privilege is the
pivotal issue presented in state secrets privilege cases.
However, the current standard for evaluating state secrets privilege claims does not clearly delineate the court's role in deciding
whether to uphold claims of the privilege. Because terms such as
"from all the circumstances," "reasonable danger," and "national security" are not easy to concretely define, and because of the constitutional implications pervading every state secrets case, the judiciary
tends to automatically defer to the executive's assertion of the privilege, without making its own independent review if the circumstances
warrant such a privilege. A claim of the state secrets privilege creates
almost an irrebuttable presumption that national security interests are
at stake. Thus, the time has come for the courts to revamp the standard currently employed to weigh claims of the state secrets privilege,
in order to restore the equilibrium to the litigation process between
the private litigant and the government. Such equilibrium could be
achieved through the use of a qualified privilege for state secrets. A
qualified privilege would allow the courts to more effectively balance
the litigant's need for discovery against the government's legitimate
interest in secrecy.
A.

United States v. Nixon - Executive Privilege

In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court attempted to define
the proper allocation of power between the executive and the judiciary in the determination of executive privilege for confidential communications. 136 In Nixon, seven staff members and political associates
of President Nixon were indicted for conspiracy to obstruct justice
and other offenses relating to the Watergate break-in. 37 The grand
jury also named the President as an unindicted co-conspirator. 13
Upon motion by the Special Prosecutor,' 3 9 the district court issued a
subpoena duces tecum to the President to produce tapes and documents relating to specified conversations between the President and
136.
137.
138.
139.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 688.
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his aides.140 In response to this subpoena, the President released edited transcripts of forty-three conversations, including portions of
twenty conversations subject to subpoena.' 4' The President then
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming an absolute privilege of confidentiality for executive communications. 42 The district court denied
the motion and ordered delivery for in camera inspection of the original documents of all subpoenaed items. 143 The decision was affirmed
by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. 144 The matter
45
was heard by the Supreme Court on an expedited basis.
The Court first rejected the President's contention that "the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's
claim of privilege."'' 46 The Court noted that "each branch of the
Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the
others."" 47 However, the Court reasoned that the judicial power
"vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can
no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive... can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress
48
share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto."'
The Court concluded that any other decision "would be contrary to
the basic concept of separation of powers. '14 9 In so doing, the Court
reaffirmed the holding in Marbury v. Madison that "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
1
law is.
150 Thus, the Court, not the Executive, must evaluate claims
of presidential privilege.
Next, the Court rejected the President's claim that executive
privilege was absolute. ' 5' In support of this claim of an absolute executive privilege, the President relied upon the need for protection of
communications between high government officials and those who as140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 689.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 703.
Id.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id.
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sist them. 52 To the extent that these communications were in the
exercise of Article II powers, the Court recognized that the privilege
of confidentiality was constitutionally based. 53 Yet, the Court refused to accord the executive an absolute privilege, even though such
privilege had a constitutional basis.
The President next asserted, in support of an absolute privilege,
that the doctrine of separation of powers "insulates a President from a
judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby
protects confidential Presidential communications.' 54 However, the
Court held that where the claim of privilege is a generalized one, the
privilege was only qualified. 55 The Court stated that in a criminal
prosecution where there is a strong showing of need for discovery of
privileged communications, the court will balance the need for the
information shown by the litigant against the President's right of confidentiality. 56 If the demonstrated need for the evidence outweighs
the generalized claim of privilege, the court will require the President
to submit the evidence for in camera inspection.15 7 The Court reasoned that this balancing of competing interests by the Judiciary was
essential in order for the Judiciary to maintain its institutional integrity within the tripartite scheme of government created by the
Constitution.1 58
B.

United States v. Nixon: Civil Litigation Where
the Government Defends

In United States v. Nixon, the Court expressly refrained from de152. Id. at 705.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 706.
155. Id. As J. Sirica noted in the circuit court decision, the President misconstrued the
rationale of the doctrine of separation of powers:
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 715 n.73. J. Sirica also noted that "to leave the proper scope and
application of Executive privilege to the President's sole discretion would represent a mixing,
rather than a separation of Executive and Judicial functions." Id.
156. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
157. Id. at 713.
158. Id. at 706. The Court also reasoned that "[t]he impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch
to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts
under Art. III." Id. at 707.
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ciding the issue of the balance to be struck between the President's

generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation.1 59 However, this issue was directly addressed
60
in Dellums v. Powell.'
In Dellums, a group of demonstrators filed a class action suit

against former President Richard Nixon and former Attorney General John Mitchell. The plaintiffs sought damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights stemming from their arrest on the
steps of the United States Capitol during May Day demonstrations in
1971.161 In connection with their civil action, plaintiffs obtained a
subpoena duces tecum directing the White House counsel to appear

before the Court and produce all tapes and transcripts of White
House conversations discussing such demonstrations during the period when the relevant events took place. 162 Mr. Nixon filed a motion

to quash the subpoena, which was denied. 163

The President

appealed. 164

The majority first rejected Mr. Nixon's contention that "a formal
claim of privilege based on the generalized interest of presidential confidentiality, without more, works an absolute bar to discovery of presidential conversations in civil litigation, regardless of the relevancy or
necessity of the information sought."'' 65 The Court stated that executive privilege, even in the context of civil litigation is presumptive
rather than absolute, and that the existence of the privilege was ulti166
mately a determination to be made by the court.
The majority then focused on Mr. Nixon's main contention, that
159. Id. at 712 n.19. The Court stated:
We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with
that between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information,
nor with the President's interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the
conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality
and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.
Id.
160. 561 F.2d 242 (1977).
161. Id. at 244. The court noted: "Plaintiffs - appellees essentially charged that defendants deprived them of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
and infringed their rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom to petition
the government for redress of grievances in violation of the First Amendment." Id. at 244 n.2
(referring to Brief of Appellees at 26).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 245.
165. Id. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 246.
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the recognition for civil litigation of a presumptive executive privilege,
would serve as a chill upon high level executive communications sub67
jecting every proposal to public disclosure through civil discovery.
Mr. Nixon argued that the constitutional mandate articulated in
United States v. Nixon for disclosure of privileged material was limited to criminal litigation. 168 However, the Court disagreed and held
that:
[T]here is also a strong constitutional value in the need for disclosure in order to provide the kind of enforcement of constitutional
rights that is presented by a civil action for damages, at least
where, as here, the action is tantamount to a charge of civil conspiracy among high officers of government to deny a class of citizens their constitutional rights and where there has been sufficient
to avoid the inference that the demand
evidentiary substantiation 69
reflects mere harassment.

The Court concluded that where plaintiffs in a civil action can
make a preliminary showing of necessity for information that is not
merely demonstrably relevant but indeed substantially material to
their case, their need for discovery will outweigh a generalized claim
of executive privilege. 70 The Court reasoned that although plaintiffs
had "not established with absolute certainty that conversations concerning the demonstrations actually took place between Mr. Nixon
and those with whom he consulted during the time frame embraced
by the subpoena," it was enough that it was "highly likely that such
conversations did take place and were recorded, and there is a substantial possibility that Mr. Nixon discussed the matter with Mr.

the lower court
Mitchell ....,,171 Consequently, the Court 1affirmed
72
decision, and ordered inspection in camera.
The significance of Dellums is that it firmly establishes that when
a civil litigant can make a clear showing of necessity for privileged
material, this showing of need will outweigh a generalized claim of
executive privilege. Moreover, the litigant need not establish with
"certainty" the existence of the privileged matter, but rather, need
only establish that it is "highly likely" that such material exists. Fi167. Id.
168. Id. at 247.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 249.
171. Id. at 248-49.
172. The rationale of Dellums has been circulated by other courts. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v.
United States, 514 F.2d 1020 (1975); Halpern v. Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975).
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nally, it is important to realize that in Dellurns, there was substantial
evidence that the executive had intentionally violated individual constitutional rights, and had attempted to shield that violation behind a
cloak of privilege. Consequently, the court employed a qualified privilege in a civil case where the executive was the defendant, in order to
facilitate the ability of the private litigant to gain vital discovery
against the government for alleged misconduct.
VII.

PROPOSAL FOR A QUALIFIED STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

So long as the state secrets privilege immunizes the executive
from civil discovery, the executive will continue to invoke the privilege indiscriminately. This poses serious ramifications for the continued integrity of the federal judiciary. As two authors have noted, "[i]t
would be an unfortunate world, indeed, in which the growth of the
powers of state intervention in the affairs of the private citizens and
social and political groupings was not accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the powers of impartial adjudicators to check the
exercise and prevent the abuse of those powers."' 173 Moreover, the
current deference accorded claims of the state secrets privilege by the
courts draws into serious question our constitutional notion of separation of powers.
As a result, the courts should employ the qualified privilege and
balancing process formulated in United States v. Nixon, and applied to
civil litigation against the government in Dellums v. Powell. This balancing process would take into account the litigant's necessity for discovery of the privileged material, the relative sensitivity of the
material, and the likelihood of damage to national security if disclosed. In situations where the litigant shows a high degree of necessity for the material and the government opposes discovery for
legitimate considerations of national security, the courts can formulate alternatives to discovery to compensate the litigant for the loss of
74
the evidence. 1
This balancing process will lessen the incentive for the executive
to over-classify material and oppose discovery on fallacious grounds.
173. Comment, Crown Privilege and Executive Privilege: A British Response to An American Controversy, 25 STAN. L. REV. 836, 844 (1973).
174. For example, secondary evidence of the nonsecret elements of generally secret documents may be offered. Under this alternative, the Government would be allowed to delete
privileged matter from a document under court supervision and then present the opposing
party with a copy of the document as deleted. See Zagel, supra note 14, at 886.
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The result will be a more efficient and equitable discovery process.1 75
Finally, the courts, by treating the state secrets privilege as qualified
rather than as absolute, will restore symmetry between the individual
litigant and the government in the litigation process.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has analyzed the current standard of review for
claims of the state secrets privilege established in United States v.
Reynolds. This Comment has asserted that under the Reynolds standard, the degree of judicial involvement in assessing claims of the
state secrets privilege by the federal executive is left unresolved. As a
result, the federal judiciary has tended to treat claims of this privilege
as absolute. In so doing, the courts have abdicated their role of balancing the competing interests of the litigant and the government to
the caprice of the executive. This Comment has also set forth seven
reasons why the Reynolds standard, as currently formulated, is inadequate in striking an appropriate balance between the interests of the
litigant and the government. Finally, this Comment has proposed
that, under the rationale of United States v. Nixon, as applied to civil
litigation in Dellums v. Powell, the state secrets privilege should be
qualified. Under this qualified approach, the decision whether to uphold a specific state secrets privilege claim would be left to the judgment of the federal judiciary, after balancing the need for discovery by
the litigant against the government's legitimate interest in secrecy.
Barry A. Stulberg
175. Moreover, while unfettered executive control over the state secrets privilege poses
serious dangers to the judicial process, little is lost if the court makes an independent determination of the validity of the privilege claim:
Limited disclosure to the judge will reduce the loss of secrecy. If the executive is as
careful in claiming the privilege as it maintains, it will win in the overwhelming
number of cases.... While very little is lost by an independent judicial determination
of the privilege, a great deal is gained in terms of a fair and efficient legal system.
See Zagel, supra note 14, at 901-02.

